

M³: Applying Microkernel-Ideas to Hardware

Nils Asmussen

ROSS, 15th November 2021

Barkhausen Institut




- Research institute in Dresden, founded end of 2017
- Currently about 40 people
- Low-latency and secure IoT systems
- Focus on research and demonstrators

Barkhausen Institut




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Motivation



- Microkernels in a nutshell
 - No isolation between components in monolithic OS
 - Single exploitable bug anywhere \rightarrow game over
 - Microkernel-based systems split OS into isolated and unprivileged components
 - 96% of Linux CVEs would no longer be critical, 40% would be eliminated [1]

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- Microkernel-based systems have proven valuable for other objectives: Low-noise execution, real time, flexibility, ...

[1] S. Biggs, et al.: The Jury Is In: Monolithic OS Design Is Flawed. 9th Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems (APSys'18), 2018

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- Microkernel-based systems have proven valuable for other objectives: Low-noise execution, real time, flexibility, ...
- Recently, new challenges are coming from the hardware side
 - Heterogeneous systems
 - Third-party components
 - Security issues of complex general-purpose cores

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Hardware Complexity: Heterogeneity






- Demanded by performance and energy requirements
- Big challenge for OSes: single shared kernel on all cores does no longer work
- OSes need to be prepared for compute units with different feature sets

Hardware Complexity: Untrusted Hardware Components












- Provided by third-party vendors
- Bug in such a component can compromise whole system (see Broadcom incident)
- Side channels in modern cores allow attackers to leak private data; some bypass all security measures of the core (address spaces, virtualization, ...)
- Have been lurking in CPUs for many years, also due to complexity




Microkernel	







Microkernel				
Core	Core	Core		





Management	
Microkernel	





Management	
Microkernel	
Enforcement	







Management	
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






• TCU as new hardware component








Key ideas:

TCU as new hardware component




Key ideas:

- TCU as new hardware component
- Kernel on dedicated tile

[1] Asmussen et al.; M³: A Hardware/Operating-System Co-Design to Tame Heterogeneous Manycores, ASPLOS 2016






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Key ideas:

- TCU as new hardware component
- Kernel on dedicated tile
- Kernel manages, TCU enforces




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 $\mu\text{-kernel-ideas}$ applied to HW:

- μ-kernel contains essence of monolithic kernel
- TCU contains essence of μ-kernel

TCU-based Communication






TCU provides *endpoints* to:

Access memory

(contiguous range, byte granular)

TCU-based Communication




TCU provides *endpoints* to:

 Access memory (contiguous range, byte

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- Receive messages into a receive buffer
- Send messages to a receiving endpoint

TCU-based Communication




TCU provides *endpoints* to:

- Access memory (contiguous range, byte granular)
- Receive messages into a receive buffer
- Send messages to a receiving endpoint
- Replies for RPC



M³: The Operating System

- M³: Microkernel-based system for het. manycores (or L4 ± 1)
- Implemented from scratch in Rust and C++
- Drivers, filesystems, etc. implemented on user tiles
- Kernel manages permissions, using capabilities
- TCU enforces permissions (communication, memory access)
- Kernel is independent of other tiles







- M³x: Autonomous Accelerators via Context-Enabled Fast-Path Communication Nils Asmussen, Michael Roitzsch, Hermann Härtig, USENIX ATC 2019
- SemperOS: A Distributed Capability System Matthias Hille, Nils Asmussen, Pramod Bhatotia, Hermann Härtig, USENIX ATC 2019
- Untrusted Cores in a Shared System Under review for ASPLOS 2022
- Secure communication between devices (WIP)
- Compiler-based separation of components (WIP)




sh\$ decode in.png | fft | mul | ifft > out.raw






























Challenges:

- OS must provide generic protocols
- Accelerators need support for protocols













Generic Protocol







File protocol:

• Data in memory






- Data in memory
- Msg channel between client and server
 - req(in) for next input piece
 - req(out) for next output piece




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


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
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 - req(in) for next input piece
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- Client accesses data via TCU
- Used by *all* tiles






Off-the-shelf accelerators





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


Off-the-shelf accelerators

Accelerator Support Module (ASM):

• Interacts with TCU and accelerator






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
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


















Accelerator Chains: Evaluation






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
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
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




Accelerator Chains: Results (PCIe-like Latency)









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
Performance Comparison with Linux



- M³ vs. Linux 4.10
- Traced on Linux, replayed on M³
- M³FS vs. Linux tmpfs



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




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 - TCU contains essence of a traditional microkernel
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- M³ applies microkernel ideas to hardware
 - Add trusted communication component (TCU) next to each compute unit
 - TCU contains essence of a traditional microkernel
 - Microkernel-based system called M³ takes advantage of TCU
- M³x introduced accelerator chaining
 - Improves performance compared to traditional approach
 - Reduces CPU load to almost zero \rightarrow accelerators run autonomously